Dinamikus spektrumkiosztás: modell és árazás

Abstract

The radio spectrum is a scarce, valuable and thus expensive resource. An efficient use of frequencies is primordial, but existing management systems fail to achieve this. On one hand, a substantial amount of spectrum is wasted at a given time and place with today's rigid frequency usage policies. On the other hand, spectrum usage rights are not always given to those who have the greatest need and would benefit from it the best, eventuating in lower overall social welfare. The possibility of on-demand spectrum allocation with Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) methods, together with the pressure of a liberalized spectrum market would lead to a much more efficient spectrum usage. In this paper we propose a centralized spectrum auction method that fits to our proposed DSA framework to distribute spectrum for fixed infrastructure wireless networks according to the needs of providers. Since interference tolerance in a DSA scenario is much rewarded, our pricing scheme charges providers who do not tolerate others and interfere to a larger extent than necessary. The proposed DSA model makes it possible for the providers to handle the scarce resources more efficiently, resulting in better or more services. The proposed pricing mechanism improves the service quality even further since its objective is to maximize the „common welfare”.